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WULFt

I
INTRODUCTION

A critical factor in the future legal regime for controlling pollution of the
marine environment is the fate of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Treaty.' If one
assumes that the Treaty will achieve widespread ratification and enter into force
relatively soon, the Treaty could be dispositive in the area of marine pollution
management. However, the marine pollution framework could differ substantially
from that provided in the Treaty text if the Treaty never enters into force. Before
addressing the nature of the future pollution regime, I will first examine the question of whether the LOS Treaty is likely to obtain the requisite number of ratifications to enter into force.
II
THE FATE OF THE

LOS

TREATY

I have deliberately chosen to be provocative on the issue of whether the Treaty
will enter into force. The conventional wisdom is that the Treaty will receive sufficient ratification to enter into force quickly. I believe a reasonable case can be
made for the proposition that the LOS Treaty will not receive the sixty ratifica2
tions required to bring it into force.
Some may find this suggestion, particularly from one who has generally supported the Treaty, shocking, if not heretical. Obviously, to state this view is not
necessarily to advocate it. However, the possibility of insufficient ratification is real
Copyright © 1983 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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and must be considered. This proposition is based on my speculation-and I
emphasize it is purely my own personal speculation, not based on any insider's
information-about the attitudes of various governments towards ratification.
Attitudes ascribed to countries or regions below could be markedly different
should the Treaty obtain sufficient ratifications to enter into force. This analysis
deals solely with likely attitudes of countries as they consider whether to ratify
before the Treaty enters into force. It is assumed that most countries will find it
more difficult to be among the initial sixty states ratifying to bring the Treaty into
force than to ratify or accede to the Treaty once the initial sixty ratifications have
been obtained.
A.

United States

The U.S. position has been made clear by Assistant Secretary Malone 3 and the
comments of other speakers-the United States is out. Were there to be a change
of administrations in 1985, I do not believe this alone would result in the United
States becoming a party to the existing LOS Treaty. The LOS Conference, for a
variety of reasons not central to my thesis, cured not one of the six deficiencies
identified by President Reagan. 4 If there is a new administration in 1985, it will
be difficult for that administration to disregard the fact that those identified deficiencies were not cured. Moreover, I find it difficult to believe that the complexion
of the U.S. Senate will be so altered by 1985 that opponents of the treaty will be
unable to block ratification-a task requiring only thirty-four votes. Fred Tipson,
who has far greater insight into the U.S. Senate than I, has stated a similar view. 5
Obtaining ratification in 1985 will be rendered more difficult by the lack of a
solid core of support. The domestic coalition of support is already beginning to
erode-by 1985 it will be shaky at best. Key Congressional supporters will no
longer be on the scene, enthusiasm among the public for the treaty will have
waned, and support within the bureaucracy will have diminished. In short, a coalition for ratification may still exist, but it will be a far less focused and enthusiastic
coalition.
Finally, the United States is likely to have already taken action which will
make ratification by the United States even more difficult than it would be today.
I will explore this latter point shortly, 6 but first I shall continue to explore the
basis for the proposition that the LOS Treaty will not enter into force.
B.

Western Europe
In addition to the likelihood that the United States is out and will remain so, 7

3. See Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea Ajter UNCLOS III, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1983, at 29.
4. See Statement by the President, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 94 (Jan. 29, 1982). There was a
subsequent statement following adoption of the Convention on the Law of the Sea on April 30, 1982.
Statement by the President, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982).
5. See Tipson, Comment, LAW & COrNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1983, at 17, 18.
6. See nfra note 18.
7. Of course, were the Convention to be substantially amended to cure the major deficiencies, my
conclusion might well be different. Given the unwillingness of the Conference to modify the Treaty at the
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it also appears to me that few western Europeans are likely to come in. Many, if
not all, will sign the Treaty in Jamaica 8-signature of the Treaty is a prerequisite
to full participation in the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). 9 The Western
Europeans will wish to participate if for no other reason than to avoid criticism
from other countries that have participated in the Conference. Participation in
the PrepCom will allow them to hedge their position on the Treaty by seeking
meaningful improvements in the seabed mining regime and only thereafter
deciding whether to ratify.
Normally, a decision by these governments to sign a treaty is tantamount to a
decision to ratify,' 0 but not in this case. Satisfactory rules and regulations from the
PrepCom are essential for determining the viability of mining under the Treaty, a
proposition that all mining states have embraced. The Western European governments, therefore, will make clear when they sign that their signature is not to be
construed as a decision to seek ratification (as would normally be the case) but
rather as a decision to seek ratification only if the rules and regulations developed
by the PrepCom are satisfactory." This will allow the Western Europeans to
retain all options, including the option of ultimately not ratifying the Treaty.
Their final choice will be only partially influenced by the outcome in the
PrepCom-an outcome I would not choose to predict. Arguably, the PrepCom
outcome will be better than the outcome of the treaty negotiation, but by no
means will it be adequate to cure the six Reagan deficiencies.1 2 A distinctly
final negotiating session in the spring of 1982, it seems unlikely at best that any future efforts would cure
the major deficiencies. Nonetheless, should all participants conclude that further efforts are desirable, the
experience of the International Maritime Organization could provide a useful procedural precedent. It
concluded the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in London on
November 2, 1972. However, this Convention never attracted sufficient support to enter into force. In
1978, the Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference was convened, and the Protocol of 1978
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships was drafted in
London on February 17, 1978. The Protocol superseded the 1973 Convention. The 1978 Protocol has now
received sufficient ratification and will enter into force in October of this year. H.R. Rep. No. 1224, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reviews the background for the 1978 Protocol and sets forward the legislation to
implement the protocol. Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2297 (1980).
Even the strongest proponents of the Treaty cannot draw great comfort from the possibility of
amending the LOS Treaty. Many of the countries which may have ratified had consensus been maintained
will have gone through the decisionmaking process and concluded that ratification of the LOS Treaty is
not in their interest. It is hardly likely that they would subsequently ratify the Treaty that had been
amended to satisfy U.S. interests. This likelihood, when coupled with the improbability of negotiating
satisfactory amendments to the Treaty, makes the future prospects of the Treaty bleak indeed.
8. In fact, several major European countries did not sign the treaty at the December signing ceremony
in Jamaica. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom signed only the
Final Act, as did the United States. Washington Post, Dec. l1,1982, at A23, col. 1.
9. Signatories of the Final Act are allowed to attend meetings of the PrepCom as observers, but only
signatories of the treaty can participate in PrepCom decisionmaking. Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, adopted April 30, 1982, resolution I, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
10. In a parliamentary system, failure to ratify following a decision of the government to support a
treaty through signature is highly improbable since the requisite support would have been determined in
the decisionmaking process.
1I.
See the statements of France at the Jamaica signing ceremony (on file at the Office of Ocean Law
and Policy, Department of State).
12. The PrepCom will be unable to adopt rules and regulations that are inconsistent with the Treaty's
terms, but it could adopt procedures to reduce the harmful impact of some provisions. Thus, the unacceptable provision in the Treaty regarding procedures for future amendments, CONVENTION, supra note 1, art.
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adverse PrepCom outcome could insure that the Western Europeans stay out. But
even an improved regime for seabed mining emanating from the PrepCom will not
guarantee Western European ratification. My belief is that upon a satisfactory
conclusion of the PrepCom the decisive factor in Western Europe's decision to
ratify will be whether the Treaty has entered into force.
If a sufficient number of countries have ratified by the end of the PrepCom to
bring the Treaty into force, it will be more difficult for the Europeans to reject
ratification. If the Treaty is not in force, the Europeans are likely to conclude that
there is inadequate support for the Treaty to justify their undertaking the burdens
the Treaty entails since their ability to obtain the Treaty's benefits will be dependent upon widespread support. The issue, therefore, turns on whether there will
be adequate support by the developing countries to bring the Treaty into force. I
believe there is already ample evidence to justify speculation that support by
developing countries will be inadequate.
C.

Latin America

First, let us consider Latin America. Two key countries, Argentina and Venezuela, have made it clear they will not become parties for reasons which are largely
unique to their own circumstances.1 3 Ecuador has always been doubtful; it certainly is unlikely to ratify before the Treaty is in force.
Brazil and Peru have been among the most active in the LOS negotiation.
Brazil, a developed country posturing as a developing country, seeks a leadership
role among developing countries. As a leader, it could rush headlong into ratification, but it will not. It will wish to see where others are going before it decides
which way to lead. Even if entry into force appears likely, Brazil will still have to
confront its developed/developing state roles and it could well opt for a developed
country nonratification posture.
Peru, on the other hand, while desiring a leadership role, a capacity in which it
could be expected to seek ratification, will be caught by domestic pressures and
will be forced to look inward. These pressures see a Treaty that protects some of
Peru's domestic mining interests, but only if the seabed mining states ratify.
Acceptance of the Treaty would also mean acceptance of a rollback of its 200-mile
territorial sea. The decision by the seabed mining states to stay out, coupled with
155(4), could not be cured by the PrepCom, but it could reduce many of the negative aspects of the
technology transfer provision, Convention, supra note 1, annex III, art. 5.
The PrepCom had its first meeting in Jamaica from March 15 to April 18, 1983. It was an inauspicious
beginning because the entire session was devoted to election of officers, principally the chairman. On the
final day of the meeting Ambassador Joseph Warioba of Tanzania was elected Chairman.
13. Venezuela dislikes the formulation developed for boundary delimitation set forth in articles 74
and 83 of the LOS Treaty. (It is a tribute to the integrity of the Chairman of the Committee, Andreas
Aguillar of Venezuela, that this formulation was inserted into the Treaty after the text emerged from an
intense negotiating process.) Argentina found the transitional provision in the Conference Resolution prejudicial to its position on the Falklands/Malvinas controversy. See Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, adopted April 30, 1982, resolution III, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
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nonratification by two other 200-mile territorial sea states (Argentina and Brazil),
4
makes ratification by Peru distinctly improbable.'
What of the remaining countries in Latin America? Among those likely to
ratify early are Mexico, Chile, and possibly Colombia. The remaining countries,
particularly those in Central America, are likely to split with some in and some
out. Many Caribbean countries will ratify as a measure of support for Jamaica,
the future site of the proposed Seabed Authority, while others will find too few
national interests to be anything other than massively indifferent. On balance, I
suggest that no more than twelve Latin American countries will ratify before the
Treaty is in force.' 5 From where will the remaining forty-eight required ratifications come?
D.

Eastern Europe

The Eastern European countries clearly will sign and posture a great deal
about their commitment to the Third World, but they also will be fence-sitters
waiting to see whether sufficient support develops to justify their accepting the
Treaty's obligations. Staying with the Treaty by ratification commits Soviet prestige to the success of the Treaty. The Soviet Union cannot afford to be party to a
treaty which provides one system for mining the seabed when mining is in fact
taking place under a system contrary to the Treaty. If a party, the Soviets might
feel compelled to protect the Treaty system by attempting to preclude the alternative mining operations, else they will be forced to swallow the ignominy of being
party to an ineffectual treaty.
There should be no doubt that the Soviet preference is for the Treaty to enter
into force. They will actively foster that result.t 6 If some key Western European
countries ratify, e.g., the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Soviets might ratify in an attempt to tip the scale in favor of bringing the
Treaty into force. If most Western Europeans stay out altogether, the Soviets will
not ratify.
E.

Asia

This leaves us with the Asians and the Africans. Resolution of the ratification
issue will be determined by their position, with the attitude of the Africans least
clear. Let us first examine the question of Asian ratification, where I believe there
will be a general tendency toward ratification. There will be some notable exceptions in Asia, such as India, but most will ratify.
14. See the statement of Peru at the Jamaica signing ceremony (on file at the Office of Ocean Law
and Policy, Department of State).
15. The author must candidly state that this number is purely a guess because the attitudes of so
many governments in Latin America toward the ratification of the Treaty is simply unknown or unknowable. In making this guess, the author sought to gauge individual countries' interest in the Treaty by,
among other things, their actions at the Conference and, more importantly, by their statements outside of
fora dominated by developing country solidarity. The author also sought to consider what these countries
might look at in evaluating their interests. The author candidly acknowledges that he tended to estimate
on the low side to add credence to the proposition that the Treaty will receive insufficient ratifications to
enter into force. A similar approach was used for the other geographic regions subsequently discussed.
16. To express its preference without committing itself, the Soviet Union could have some of its satellite countries ratify.
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India will attempt to reconcile the leadership role it seeks among the developing countries with the domestic impact of ratification, particularly the financial
implications. Revenue sharing from exploitation of resources on the Indian continental shelf beyond 200 miles will raise consternation. The effect of the Treaty on
the possible exploitation of seabed deposits that India has been exploring jointly
with the Federal Republic of Germany will cause further doubts. India's required
contribution to financing the Seabed Authority, particularly when the Authority
may be viewed as having no meaningful role, will raise even greater doubts.
Finally, the Treaty will require India to surrender its claimed right to demand
notification of warships entering its territorial seas. 7 As with most countries that
seek to reconcile a proposed leadership role with conflicting domestic demands,
India will ultimately give greater weight to its domestic concerns and will stay out
of the Treaty, at least until it enters into force.
Some other Asian countries having minimal interests advanced by the Treaty
are likely to be fence-sitters as well. Among these might be Burma, Thailand,
Laos, Kampuchea, and some of the Oceana Group. In all, I would add twenty
countries to the twelve Latin American countries.
F.

Africa

Africa is my dilemma, my mystery. Africa has almost enough votes to singlehandedly bring the Treaty into force. To the extent that ratification of the LOS
Treaty is an issue for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and to the extent
that the OAU acts by consensus, obtaining approval for the Treaty could be difficult and time-consuming. Actions by the United States and others, however,
could solidify the OAU in favor of ratification. For example, were the United
States to enact legislation, make declarations, and announce policies that created
the appearance that the United States was seeking to obtain all the Treaty's benefits (particularly those dealing with commercial and military navigation) while
rejecting all the Treaty's obligations (particularly those likely to benefit African
nations, such as seabed mining and revenue sharing from continental shelf activities beyond 200 miles), Africa could unite quickly in favor of ratification.' 8
Prompt ratification by Africa and early entry into force of the Treaty could well
create a snowball effect bringing most of the fence-sitters into the Treaty system.
Absent this sort of catalytic action, questions concerning the breadth of the
territorial sea, the needs of land-based producers and the question of land-locked
17. Maritime Zones Act, 1976, cited in Limits in the Seas, No. 36 National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 82 (Department of State 1981).
18. On Mar. 30, 1983, President Reagan issued a proclamation claiming a 200-mile exclusive economic zone for the United States. Accompanying the proclamation was a statement of United States
Ocean Policy. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 383-85 (Mar. 10, 1983). Except for the portion of the
policy statement dealing with seabed mining, the proclamation and policy statement are generally consistent with the LOS Convention. To date, there has been little adverse reaction by other countries to the
Reagan Proclamation and policy statement. Bills to implement an exclusive economic zone have been
introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. S. 750, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2061,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. The Administration has not yet submitted its own legislation or commented upon the
bills thus far introduced.
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rights are among the issues likely to make the decision among the African states a
lengthy process.
Africa presently has sixteen countries with territorial seas in excess of twelve
miles. 19 The OAU, meeting in Mogadiscio in 1974, expressly left open the question of the breadth of the territorial sea in the absence of a treaty. 20 Africa could
well decide that the Treaty provision of twelve miles for the breadth of the territorial sea is inadequate in the face of nonratification by developed countries.
The land-based producers in Africa face a dilemma. On the one hand, they
believe the Treaty's protection for them is inadequate. On the other, if there is no
Treaty, there is no protection whatsoever. But if there is a Treaty without the
mining states, whatever protection the Treaty provides is purely symbolic.
The numerous land-locked states in Africa add to the complexity. On the one
hand, the grant to them in the Treaty is pitifully meager, making their enthusiasm
for the Treaty lukewarm. On the other hand, those meager benefits can only be
obtained through the Treaty, and the land-locked states are likely to seek these
benefits. Their support for the Treaty is likely to rekindle coastal state concerns
and possible opposition because land-locked benefits come at their expense.
The conclusion, I believe, is that if ratification is a question within the competence of the OAU, an answer will be some time in coming-absent any catalytic
actions by the United States and Western Europe. If the OAU does not take a
position, or even if the OAU recommends ratification by consensus, the actual
ratification by individual states will be time-consuming and uneven.
Several African countries, such as Mali, Niger, and Rwanda, will be unable to
identify enough stakes in the Treaty to justify ratification. Others, such as
Somalia, Liberia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, will find the Treaty conflicting with
existing domestic legislation. Countries like Nigeria and Kenya with leadership
aspiration may choose to lead only after it is clear where the followers are going,
and they will join the other fence-sitters until the trend is clear. Others will not
wish to grant rights that they believe are either unavailable now or at least ambiguous, e.g., Morocco with respect to straits passage. The number of African countries willing to ratify before the Treaty is in force I believe will not exceed fifteen. 2 1
When added to the thirty-two from Latin America and Asia, thirteen ratifications
will still be required to bring the Treaty into force.
19.
20.

Li*mis in the Seas, supra note 17, at 10.
The Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the issues of the law of sea states:
Pending the successful negotiation andgeneral adoption of a new regime to be established in these areas
[territorial sea and straits] by the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, this
position prejudices neither the present limits of the territorial sea of any State nor the existing rights of

States.
III Official Records of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 63, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/33
(1975) (emphasis added).
21. The election of Ambassador Warioba of Tanzania as chairman of the PrepCom, discussed supra at
note 12, could impact favorably upon ratification prospects in Africa. Ambassador Warioba has been a
forceful member of the African Group and could be very influential in collective and individual consideration of LOS ratification by the African states. Whether this talented diplomat will be able to forge consensus between developing and developed countries on the seabed issues that so polarized the LOS
Conference remains to be seen.
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Conclusion

This analysis leads me to conclude that entry into force cannot be assumed.
Concluding that the Treaty is unlikely to enter into force does not mean it will be
without influence. It already has guided and molded state action, and it will continue to do so for a period of time. 22 All coastal states will seek to take advantage
of those provisions which confer benefits upon them. What will erode over time
will be the obligations that the Treaty imposes upon them.
III
MARINE POLLUTION

In the pollution area, as Ambassador Vallarta has outlined, 23 the Treaty text
seeks to balance navigational rights against pollution concerns. Generally, the
Treaty tilts toward navigation by placing principal reliance on port states and flag
states; little competence is conferred on coastal states. Summarizing the Treaty
regime for pollution, the Treaty would confer plenary power on the port state to
set and enforce pollution standards for vessels voluntarily entering its ports. In the
territorial sea, standard setting by the coastal state would be limited to discharge
standards, while enforcement by the coastal state would generally be unlimited.
In the economic zone, the coastal state would have no real role in setting standards, and its competence to enforce against foreign ships would be limited to
discharges causing or threatening major damage. Using the Treaty regime as the
basis for comparison, I will suggest the likely future regime for pollution-a regime
that will see an increasingly larger role for the coastal state in the territorial sea
and in the economic zone.
A.

Territorial Sea

In the territorial sea, the Treaty provides that the coastal state can set standards for discharges but not for construction, design, equipment, and manning
24
unless giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards.
25
There is no such limitation on coastal state actions in existing international law,
except for the limits that the right of innocent passage places upon standards that
practically preclude passage. 2 6 Absent a Treaty, coastal states will seek to set standards for construction, design, equipment, and manning.
22. An analogy one can draw would be to the Hague Codification Conference of 1930. Following
several years of preparatory work, 42 countries met to seek agreement on the regime for the territorial sea.
It, like the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, foundered on the question of the breadth of the
territorial sea. Although unable to agree on a treaty, the Hague Conference's draft has been referred to as
"an important document in the history of international law and a landmark in the long process of codification." Reeves, The Codifcation of the Law of Territorial Waters, 24 AM. J. I.T't. L. 486, 496-97 (1930).
23. See Vallarta, Protection and Preservation of the Afarbne Environment and Alarine Scientoic Research at the
Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, LAw & CO.NTEMP. PROWt., Spring 1983, at 147.
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
25. Article 17 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone states:
"Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted
by the coastal State in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law and, in particular,
with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation." 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.
26. Paragraph I of article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
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Articles 22 and 23 of the Treaty clearly state that oil tankers have the right of
innocent passage in the territorial sea. However, passage of certain pollutionthreatening vessels such as oil tankers will, in the absence of the Treaty, be constrained. "Passage by an oil tanker is inherently non-innocent," said the Government of Canada in 1970.27 Other states are likely to follow this course and exclude
certain classes of vessels or vessels carrying certain cargoes from innocent passage
on pollution grounds.
France, for example, has sought notification prior to the passage of an oil
tanker through its territorial sea, particularly in the Straits of Dover. 28 Major
tanker traffic in the territorial sea, therefore, could face real constraints. Generally, this will not be a significant burden because tankers do not traditionally traverse the territorial sea, regardless of whether it is set at three or twelve miles. It
could, however, create some real difficulty for tankers in straits overlapped by territorial seas. The regime for straits, however, has already been addressed 29 and I
will not venture into this sensitive area.
Enforcement competence against foreign vessels for pollution offenses in the
territorial sea is generally unlimited (again excepting straits) under the Treaty, but
the Treaty does place limits on punishment. Imprisonment, under the text, may
not be imposed except for pollution incidents that are willful and serious. 30 This
generally comports with what one would expect to find in the absence of a
treaty-nations have not imprisoned and will not likely imprison foreign sailors for
minor, accidental pollution incidents. Under present U.S. law, the only marine
pollution action which authorizes imprisonment is the failure to notify authorities
3
of a pollution incident. 1
B.

Economic Zone

A great deal of navigation occurs in the 200-mile economic zone and it is in
that zone that coastal state claims for pollution control can be expected to seriously conflict with the Treaty regime. One could readily speculate that the United
uous Zone states: "The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage through the territorial sea." Id.
The LOS Treaty, in an attempt to clarify the right of coastal states to enact laws with their duty not to
hamper innocent passage, states in article 24(l)(a) that coastal states shall not impose requirements "which
have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage." Convention, supa note 1,
at 24(l) (a).
27. Ambassador Alan Beesley, then Head of the Legal Division, Department of External Affairs, in a
statement before a committee of the Canadian Parliament in 1970, stated: "It is the Canadian position
that any passage threatening the environment of a coastal state cannot be considered innocent since it
represents a threat to the coastal state's security." Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence No. 25, at 11, 28th Parl., 2d Sess. (Apr. 29, 1970). For a
thorough discussion of the Canadian actions establishing a 100-mile pollution zone in the Canadian Arctic
and extending their territorial sea to twelve miles, see Wulf, ContguousZones for Pollutzon Control An Appraisal
Under InternationalLaw, University of Miami Sea Grant Technical Bulletin No. 13 (March 1971).
28. The French law is set forth in English in Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
Document MSC XXXVIII/21 (Mar. 30, 1978).
29. See Harlow, Freedom of Navigation in a Post UNCLOS /I/ Environment, LAW & CONTENMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1983, at 125, 128-35.
30. Convention, supra note 1,art. 230.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976).
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States will be leading the charge. It should be recalled that in 1977 Congress
passed legislation which claimed general pollution competence over any vessel in
our 200-mile fishing zone. 32 This provision was subsequently amended to exclude
enforcement against foreign vessels, 33 but this amendment was obtained only after
much hard work and some fortuitous circumstances. If the United States seeks by
legislation to create a 200-mile economic zone that includes pollution competence,3 4 the likely result will be a law which claims pollution competence in excess
of that set forth in the Treaty. This likelihood is increased if Murphy's law applies
and a major tanker accident occurs off the coast of the United States while the
legislation is actively being considered by Congress.
Let us examine with more particularity first what standard setting competence
would have been permissible under the Treaty in the 200-mile zone, and second
what enforcement powers the Treaty would have authorized. The Treaty provides
no real role for the coastal state in standard setting. 35 On standard setting, one
fear traditionally advanced is that a patchwork quilt of regulations will result from
the conflicting standards promulgated by individual coastal states. This fear, it
seems to me, was perhaps justified and reasonable when there were modest or
largely ineffectual international standards. Given the steady increase in the quality of international standards from the 1973 Marine Pollution Convention ti, to the
1978 Marine Pollution Protocol, 37 one can wonder whether individual coastal
states will feel compelled to promulgate their own separate standards. Of course,
it is true with pollution incidents as with other accidents that regulations always
overlook something, and the item that was overlooked inevitably seems to play a
prominent role in the last accident. Coastal states may, therefore, seek to deal with
the overlooked item by promulgating their own standards, particularly if the international response is slow in coming. With the new procedures that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has put in place, it is able to respond, and
has responded, to incidents identifying holes in the existing regulatory fabric in a
responsible and timely fashion. 38 There are, therefore, reasons to be less concerned
now than in the past about the patchwork quilt.
32. Section 58 of Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1593 (1977).
33. Sections 6 and 7 of Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2467 (1978) (codified at 33 U.SC. § 1321(b)(5)-(6)
(Supp. II 1978)).
34. See supra note 18. Note that in the Reagan Proclamation cited therein the United States claims
jurisdiction with regard to "the protection and preservation of the marine environment." In the accompa-

n'ing policy statement it is stated:
The Exclusive Economic Zone established today will also enable the United States to take limited
additional steps to protect the marine environment. In this connection, the United States will continue to work through the International Maritime Organization and other appropriate international
organizations to develop uniform international measures for the protection of the marine environment
while imposing no unreasonable burdens on commercial shipping.
19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 383-84. It is unclear, at present, what additional limited steps the United
States will take. They may, as the Policy Statement suggests, be limited to multilateral steps through the
IMO. but if that is to be the case, one wonders why the claim to pollution competence was included in the
Reagan Proclamation.
35. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 211(5).
36. 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
ExEcfiL'\ f PK(xiLIAiN(;' OfHITif
37. See Executive C, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 JO.RN.-,s i)"
i I-I1
113 (1979) (transmitting the 1978 Marine Pollution Protocol).
38. The 1973 IMCO Conference on Marine Pollution created the Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC) as a standing body of the Organization. Amendments to the Convention on the
Sf\
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This does not mean, however, that I believe that all states will simply apply
international rules and standards in this 200-mile economic zone. Some, I believe,
will seek to place special restrictions or outright prohibitions on certain classes of
vessels or vessels carrying certain types of cargoes, based not on a theory of protecting the coastline but rather on protecting fish in the 200-mile zone. If these
claims remain limited in application and number, they are likely to be accommodated over time in the traditional claim/counterclaim process. In short, I do not
believe the evidence at hand suggests that coastal states will exercise standard setting competence in the economic zone in a manner unduly burdensome to international trade and commerce. Some burdens will result, I submit, but they will not
approach the level of a patchwork quilt.
I am not as optimistic about enforcement actions in the economic zone. States
will not limit themselves to the very narrow circumstances set forth in the Treaty
where they are authorized to take enforcement actions.3 9 Rather, they will claim
enforcement competence against any vessel that violates the international standards applicable in their economic zones.
Two factors significantly temper the burden such enforcement competence will
create for international trade and commerce. First, few countries have the actual
capability to enforce their laws effectively in their 200-mile zones. Second, those
countries that have meaningful enforcement capabilities generally also have maritime fleets. The threat of reciprocal actions against their fleets will temper use of
these capabilities. Problems, however, will exist. Countries' capabilities will
increase and while they may not be able to enforce effectively in their entire zones,
they will have sufficient capability to enforce against those offending vessels which
they observe violating their pollution laws.
As in the territorial sea, specialized vessels or vessels carrying specific cargoes
will bez particularly at risk. Since few countries have an interest in such vessels or
cargoes, the restraining influence of reciprocity will not operate. Resulting standard setting and enforcement actions will delay some commerce for periods of time
and could result in the imposition of some burdensome penalties.
There will be a significant risk that pollution controls could be used as a
method for applying politically inspired sanctions against a state that is internationally disfavored, such as Israel or South Africa. Finally, if there is a further
deterioration in world public order, one could foresee the possible abuse of this
power, particularly by one state against its neighbor. The maritime commerce of
many countries is dependent upon crossing the economic zone of their neighbor.
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044.
289 U.N.T.S. 3, were submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, giving the MEPC equal status
with other standing bodies and establishing procedures for expediting their recommendations on needed
regulations. Executive S, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 JOURNAL OF ExECUTIVE PRx:EEDINGS ()W" TilE
SENATE 383, 384 (1979).
39. Paragraph 6 of article 220 of the Convention, supra note 1. provides for coastal state enforcement
action, including detention of the vessel, for a violation in the economic zone "resulting in a discharge
causing major damage or threat of major damage" to the coastline or the resources of the territorial sea or
economic zone.
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For example, some Central American countries have access to the Atlantic only by
transiting the 200-mile economic zone of their neighbor. 4° Pollution competence
could provide the justification or leverage to impede maritime commerce to and
from such zone-locked states. Pollution control and enforcement, therefore, could
be used as a far less belligerent act than a blockade of maritime commerce, while
achieving similar results.
C.

Conclusion

It is clear that pollution controls present the greatest opportunity to interfere
with navigation. Concerns about reciprocal actions by others and the identifiable
need to protect their own seaborne commerce will temper use of pollution controls
by many states. Standard setting competence claimed by coastal states will in virtually all cases exceed that specified in the Convention and could, if abusively
applied, create a significant impediment to, and burden on, commercial navigation. Assuming relative constancy in the need for commercial navigation and in
adherence to minimal world order standards, most states, however, will exercise
their expansive claims to standard setting competence by simply incorporating as
their national standard the international rules and standards established by the
IMO. The threat created by the exercise of standard setting competence will be
greatest for specialized ships and ships containing specific cargoes that are alleged
to pose a significant pollution risk. For these vessels, reciprocity will not serve as a
restraint because few states have similar ships or carry similar cargoes.
With respect to enforcement, states will claim more than the Treaty offers and
will seek to exercise this broader enforcement competence. Any vessel caught committing a violation of coastal state standards (even if derived from international
standards) will be subject to enforcement action by the coastal state both in the
territorial sea and in the 200-mile economic zone. Some burdens will result and
the risk of abusive and discriminatory use of this power will remain a major concern. The vast majority of international trade and commerce, however, will continue relatively unhampered. If the burden increases, actions will have t*o be taken
to reduce them to acceptable levels. Lacking alternatives, these actions may have
to be taken through the IMO.

40. It is impossible for the continental countries of Central America, or the traffic through the
Panama Canal, to reach the Atlantic without transiting the 200-mile zone of one or more countries. Other
countries can be seriously disadvantaged if navigation in the economic zone is seriously impeded For
example. to sail north from Argentina vessels must either navigate in the Brazilian 200-mile zone or proceed far east in the South Atlantic.

